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RONALD G. CUMMINGS AND GLENN W.
HARRISON*

Was the Ohio Court Well
Informed in its Assessment of the
Accuracy of the Contingent
Valuation Method?
ABSTRACT

The District Court of Appeals for Washington D.C. has upheld a
Department of the Interiorruling that accepts as a best available
procedure for reliably calculating natural resources damages the
ContingentValuationsMethod (CVM). This paperaddressesa number of questions that are relevant for assessing the reliability,or
accuracy, of CVM values. Empirical evidence concerning the extent to which CVM subjects behave strategically, i.e., misrepresent their true values, is found to be mixed. While results from
received empiricalstudies do not support unequivocal conclusions
one way or another,their results suggest that CVM values may
overestimate real economic commitments by a considerablemargin. It is then argued that the courts cannot accept CVM values
out of hand; they must carefully assess the demonstrated potential
for such overestimates of value in their deliberations concerning
the use of results from CVM surveys in CERCLA litigation.
INTRODUCTION
In the 1980 enactment of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) and subsequent
amendments, Congress instructed the Department of the Interior (DOI)
to establish regulations that would identify the best availableprocedures
with which Trustees of natural and environmental resources might assign monetary damages to any injury to these resources. Such damage
estimates were to serve as a basis for the Trustees' efforts to recover
compensation under provisions of the Act. The regulations established
by D012 were subsequently challenged by the State of Ohio and other
intervenors in a Federal District Court.3 One important basis of the chal* Respectively, Noah Langdale Professor of Environmental Policy, Policy Research
Center, Georgia State University, University Plaza, Atlanta, GA 30303, and Dewey H.
Johnson Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, College of Business
Administration, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208.
1. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9651(c).
2. 51 Fed. Reg. 27673, 27720 (August 1, 1986).
3. State of Ohio v. U.S. Departmunt of the Interior, 880 F.2nd. at 474.
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lenge was the DOI's adoption of the "lesser-of" rule: resource damages
were to be measured by the lesser of restoration costs and use values,
where use values were essentially equated with market values. In 1989,
the Ohio court found the DOI's rule too restrictive given the perceived
intent of Congress to provide compensative damages for natural resource injuries. In terms of a statutory definition of "use value," the
court found that other values such as "option" or "existence values"4
(in general, "nonuse values"), were not to be excluded out of hand.
The court instructed DOI to review their regulations to the end of providing a rule that would allow Trustees to develop values for resources
damage " . . . by summing up all reliably calculated use values5 , so

long as the trustee does not double count." 6 As a best available procedure for reliably calculatingstatutory use values, the court effectively
put it's imprimatur on a7 survey method known as the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM).
The CVM involves the use of surveys describing the good or
resource injury to be valued, a rule that relates financial payments to
the provision of the good or the avoidance of the injury, and a question that asks the subject to report a maximum willingness to pay
(WTP) some amount of money to see the good provided or the injury
avoided. Both the "good" and the subject's payment are hypothetical.
These features of the CVM, particularly hypothetical payment, are the
source of concern over the extent to which values derived using this
method actually reflect real economic commitments in any precise
way.8 Those who assert that the CVM is subject to gross errors, resulting
4. Id at 464. The notion of "nonuse values" refers to a valuation that a person might
have for some natural resource even if he or she had no intention to ever use the resource.
Although some controversy exists as to what components of "total value" can be attributed
to "use value" and "nonuse value", our focus here is on the measurement of "total value."
For an extensive discussion of the literature on "nonuse value", see R. Cummings & G.
Harrison, Existence Values and Compensable Damages: Judicial Reliance on Empty Economic
Concepts?, Economics Working Paper B-92-05, Department of Economics, College of
Business Administration, University of South Carolina, 1992.
5. Note here that "use values" are of the statutory type, and therefore may include
what economists define as nonuse values. The Ohio court appeared to take the eminently
sensible view that all values were "use values" in the broad sense of being attributable
to the use of some aspect of the resource (e.g., it's mere existence). Economists employ
the term "use value" more narrowly to refer to current or expected use of the physical
resource itself (e.g., for recreation).
6. Id.
7. "We sustain DOI in its conclusion that CV methodology is a 'best available
procedure.' As such, its conclusion in the Natural Resource Damage Assessment regulations
was entirely proper." Supra note, at 98.
8. The strengths and weaknesses of the CVM are assessed in several studies. See, for
example, R. Cummings,et. al, Valuing Environmental Goods: A State of the Arts Assessment
of the Contingent Valuation Method, Rowman & Allenheld (Totowa, NJ: 1986); R. Mitchell,
& R. Carson, Using Surveys to Value Public Goods: The Contingent Valuation Method, Johns
Hopkins Press (Baltimore: 1989); and R. Cummings, & G. Harrison, Identifying and
Measuring Nonuse Values for Natural and Environmental Resources: A CriticalReview of the
State of the Art, American Petroleum Institute (114 pp., Washington, DC: 1992).
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in substantial divergences between CVM-estimated values and real economic commitments, sharply criticize the rationale for the Ohio court's
implicit acceptance of the method as a best available procedure for reliably calculating natural resources damages. 9 For example,
"... even if it were true that contingent valuation measured
non-use damages, albeit with gross errors, there would be
no principled basis for deliberately choosing to make important
social policy on the basis of a method that is known to be
grossly inaccurate. Voodoo, after all, is a method of forecasting the future that has at least as many adherents as contingent valuation; no one would suggest that economic
forecasting should be based on it merely because other methods have their deficiencies. Lack of alternatives is not a reason for the knowing use of an inaccurate method for assessing
damages; if it is the case that non-use damages cannot be
measured to any reasonable degree of accuracy, then such
damages should not be awarded." 10
The Ohio court heard several claims as to the "voodoo" nature of the
CVM. In rejecting these claims the Ohio court appears to have relied
on established legal criteria for determining the admissibility of survey data.11 These criteria are based on "necessity" and the "circumstantial guiaranty of trustworthiness." 12 "Necessity" involves the:
"... comparison of the probative value of the survey with
the evidence, if any, which as a practical matter could be used
if the survey were excluded. If the survey is more valuable,
then necessity exists for the survey, i.e, it is the inability to
get 'evidence of the same value' which makes the13 hearsay
statement [represented by the survey] necessary."
9. We should note that damage estimates based on the CVM have been used in an
actual litigation under CERCLA in only one instance thus far: Idaho v. Southern Refrigerated
Transport Inc., 1991 Westlaw 22479 (D. Idaho 1991). The court found that the CVM used
by Idaho to estimate existence values was legally insufficient to establish such values
in a credible way. It should be noted that this finding was not based on a rejection of
the CVM per se, but on the "benefits transfer" way that the CVM was used. The study
used by Idaho was a CVM study prepared by Battelle Northwest Laboratories for valuing
a doubling in the runs of steelhead and salmon in the entire Columbia River Basin. Idaho

used the results ($16.97 per non-returning adult steelhead) as an existence value for 1,688
non-returning adult fish in the Salmon River, which is a very small part of the Columbia
River's drainage area. Interestingly the court accepted results from a U.S. Forestry Service
conducted study using the Travel Cost Method, another survey method, for the purpose
of valuing recreational values that were at issue in this case.
10. J. Daum, Some Legal and Regulatory Aspects of Contingent Valuation, Section 9 in
Contingent Valuation: A Critical Assessment, Cambridge Economics, Inc. (Cambridge,
MA: 1992), at 30.
11. See, particularly, Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F Supp.
670, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
12. Id., at 683.
13. Supra note 11, at 683.
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Criteria related to the "guaranty of trustworthiness" of a survey infaulty narclude the four dangers of faulty memory, faulty perception,
14
ration and insincerity on the part of survey respondents.
The Ohio court explicitly responded to criticism that the CVM
can lead to overestimates of actual WTP, given that payment in the CVM
is hypothetical.' 5 Specifically, it found that:
"The simple and obvious safeguard against overstatement,
however, is more sophisticated questioning. Even as matters
now stand, the risk of overestimation has not been shown
to produce such egregious results as to justify judicial overruling of DOI's careful
estimate of the caliber and worth of
" 16
CV methodology.
The motivation for this paper is the apparent lack of information available to the Ohio court regarding the risk that CVM values
may substantially overestimate real economic commitments on the part
of subjects. It is our view that the three studies considered by the court
in this regard 17 do not reflect the state-of-the-art understanding of the
relationship between CVM values and real economic commitments. A
comprehensive understanding of this relationship may well result in
much less sanguine view than that adopted by the Ohio court regarding the significant potential for overestimation of value by the CVM.
The purpose of our paper is to provide this understanding by critically
reviewing the current state of the art in the economics literature.
One finds in the economics literature a concern with issues that
parallel the court's concern with "dangers of perception" and "dangers of insincerity." The economics counterpart to these concepts are
referred to as "preference research" and "strategic behavior," and are
14. See the Zippo case (supra note 11). For a set of more technical criteria for assessing
the "trustworthiness" of a survey, see Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, 559 F.
Supp. 1189, 1205 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), particularly at 1205.

15. As an aside, we note the Ohio court's finding (supra note 3 at 96) that "Certainly
nothing in CV methodology itself shapes the injury inflicted by an environmental
disaster." Related to the "dangers of faulty narration" criterion, however, we note that
the CVM does indeed shape the injury inflicted by an environmental disaster that is
valued in the application of the CVM. For studies that demonstrate the effects on CVM
value associated with changes in the way that "injury" is describedin the CVM questionnaire,
see J.Bergstromet. al, Information Effects in Contingent Markets, American J. Agricultural

Economics, 71, 687-691, August 1989, and J. Bergstrom, et. al, The Impact of Information
on EnvironmentalCommodity Valuation Decisions, American J. Agricultural Economics, 72,
614-621, August 1990.
16. Supra note 3 at 97.
17. The studies cited by the court were R. Bishop, & T. Heberlein, Measuring Values
of Extra Market Goods: Are Indirect Measures Biased? American J. Agricultural Economics,
61, 926, 1979; E. Yang, et. al, The Use of Economic Analysis in Valuing Natural Resource
Damages: An Overview, Unpublished Manuscript, Environmental Law Institute, 1983; and
R. Bishop, et. al, Does Contingent Valuation Work? Results of the Sandhill Experiment,
Unpublished Manuscript, Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell University,
August 1984.

Winter 19941

OHIO COURT ASSESSMENT

discussed in section II. In section III we directly address the question:
what do we know about the relationship between CVM values and values that reflect real economic commitments? The answer to this question is relevant for legal assessments as to the claim that CVM estimates
might constitute "egregious results." Concluding remarks are offered
in section IV.
STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR, PERCEPTIONS AND CVM VALUES.
In this section we address two issues that relate to legal criteria for the admissibility of surveys as evidence in litigation for compensable damages. The first concerns the extent to which subjects in
an application of CVM might have incentives to behave "strategically,"
which bears directly upon the "sincerity" of the subjects. The second
involves the extent to which CVM subjects perceive and understand
the valuation task asked of them, which relates to the dangers of faulty
perception.
Strategic behavior per se is not undesirable in the CVM. Some
types of strategic behavior, most importantly truth-telling' 8, are required
if values offered by subjects are to be taken as representing real economic commitments. The strategic bias issue instead refers to strategic
behavior whereby CVM subjects report values that do not represent
real economic commitments. This type of behavior, suggested by Samuelson1 9 as being unavoidable in questionnaires that attempt to estimate
values for public goods, as opposed to private goods, 20 involves subjects reporting values which they hope will influence the results of a
survey in directions that they view as being favorable to them.
18. This is called "non-strategic behavior" in the CVM literature. This is potentially
misleading, since one will always expect rational agents to be responding strategically
to the game they are confronted with irrespective of whether or not they are telling the
truth. Nonetheless, the older CVM literature uses the terms "truth-telling" and "nonstrategic behavior" synonymously, We will similarly be using the notion of "sincere"
behavior in the legal sense of truth-telling, even though it is perfectly possible for a
rational agent to engage in misrepresentation from a sincere game-theoretic perspective.
In all cases the context should make clear our meaning.
19. P. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, Review of Economics and
Statistics, 36, 386-389, November, 1954.
20. V. Smith (Arbitrary Values, Good Causes, and Premature Verdicts, J.Environ. Economics
and Management, 22,71-89, January, 1992 at fn. 1) suggests that in a later paper Samuelson
(P. Samuelson, Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories, Review of Economic and Statistics,
40, 332-338, 1958) was more optimistic concerning the prospects for eliciting people's
values through questionnaires. Smith refers to Samuelson's statement following reference
to the strategic bias issue: ".... I do not wish to be too pessimistic. After all, the world's
work does somehow get done. And to say that market mechanisms are non-optimal, and
that there are difficulties with most political processes, does not imply that we can never
find new mechanisms of a better sort I... as an example regarding strategic biasl
Interrogate people for their tastes with respect to public goods in such large homogeneous
groups as to give each respondent the feeling that his answer can be a 'true' one without
costing him anything extra." ISamuelson, cited above, at supra note 19 at 3341 In his
later considerations as to how one might devise a system of "benefit taxation" which
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Strategic bias may reflect any number of motivations. Subjects
may report a "value" for the purpose of making a statement concerning strongly held ideological views regarding the good in question. If
a subject feels that a particular public good will be provided regardless of the level of payment determined in a survey, she may purposely
"free-ride" on the contributions of others by reporting a very low value
to minimize the amount she will ultimately pay for the good. Alternatively, she may believe that she will not ultimately pay for the public good, but that the decision as to whether or not the good will be
provided depends upon the results of the survey. If so, she may be motivated to over-value the good in the hope of having the good provided
(at no real cost to her). We consider the type of strategic behavior that
has been of primary concern to most CVM researchers: free-riding.
One finds in the CVM literature the conventional wisdom that
it is well established that subject behavior in the CVM will not in any
substantive sense involve free-riding. For example:
"Compared with the experiments [from the experimental
economics literature], which show a low level of strategic
behavior, we conclude from the evidence that strategic behavior in properly designed CV surveys should be even
lower. The evidence is sufficiently extensive and consistent,
we feel, to shift the burden of proof to the shoulders of those
who would continue to challenge the validity of all CV studies on grounds of strategic behavior. This judgement should
not be taken to imply that the CV analyst can totally dismiss
the possibility of bias caused by strategic behavior (...

)

some types of CV studies
are more prone to strategic be21
havior than others."
"However, several types of evidence tend to corroborate the
reliability of CVM results. First, CVM results are consistent
with preferences revealed by actual choice behavior ...empirical evidence appears inconsistent with the conventional
22
models of strategic misstatement."
...[Tihe specter of Samuelson's strategic bias proposition
remained as a concern ...

until the appearance of Vernon

Smith's report of experimental 23
evidence that further belied
the strategic bias proposition."
would in some sense make people pay for what they get, he concludes "Instantly, you
will discover that the same game-theory reasons that compel rational men to hide their
desires for public goods will be motivating them to hide their consumers' surpluses from
different product configurations." [Samuelson, cited above, supra note 19 at 3341
21. Mitchell & Carson, supra note 19 at 162.
22. J. Hoehn, & A. Randall, A Satisfactory Beirefit-Cost Indicatorfor Contingent Valuation,
J. Environ. Economics and Management, 14, 226-247, 1987 at 227.
23. Cummings, et. al, supra note 8 at 16.

Winter 19941

OHIO COURT ASSESSMENT

"Studies by Bohm, Scherr and Babb, and Smith tend to ineconomists relating to gamesmandicate that fears among
24
exaggerated."
are
ship
"Empirical evidence thus far does not support the existence
25
of strategic bias among consumers."
".... survey work with consumers has failed to show any evidence of strategic bias in valuing public goods. This result
agrees with the experimental work of Grether and Plott and
Smith, who also failed to find evidence of strategic economic
26
behavior in experimental settings."
Statements of this type invite the reader to accept as "fact" that there
is unequivocal evidence that supports one or more of the following
statements:
1) the valuation behavior of subjects in the institutional setting used in experimental economics can be assumed to characterize behavior in the institutional setting of the CVM;
and/or
2) notwithstanding substantive differences between the valuation institutions used in experimental economics and that
used in the CVM, subject behavior in the CVM is reasonably
similar to that observed in the institutions used in experimental economics;
and/or
3) within the valuation institution of CVM, it has been demonstrated that subjects do not behave strategically.
Statements one and two presume that experimental studies conclusively show little free-riding. This issue is taken up as a digression below.
We next review evidence for each of these statements.
Experimental institutions and the CVM
Can the valuation behavior of subjects in the institutional environment used in experimental economics be assumed to characterize behavior in the CVM institutional environment? 27 In experimental
economics, two valuation institutions have primarily been used to research free-riding behavior: the Smith (or Unanimity) Auction and the
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism.
24. Bishop & Heberlein, supra note 17, at 928.
25. W. Schulze, et. al, Valuing Environnental Commodities: Some Recent Experiments,
Land Economics, 57, 151-172, May, 1981 at 156.
26. W. Schulze, et. al, The Economic Benefits of Preserving Visibility in the National
Parklands of the Southwest, Nat. Res. J., 23, 149-173, January, 1983 at 153.
27. One might also interpret this statement as simply saying that institutions don't
matter. Of course, this statement involves an issue that is basic to all research conducted
in the field of experimental economics: institutions do matter.This is to say that individual
choice behavior depends, in general, on the institutional environment within which choices
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The Smith Auction was introduced and developed by V.L.
Smith. 28 His are the works most often cited by CVM researchers as providing evidence that subjects generally do not free-ride. The salient institutional characteristics of the typical Smith Auction are:
(a.1) Subjects are given an interest-free loan at the outset of
the experiment; this loan can only be used to buy shares of
a public good.
(a.2) Subjects receive a monetary reward (a payoff) which
depends on the number of units of the public good that is
produced (how this number is determined is explained
below). For example, they may each receive (say) $10.00 if 6
units of the good is produced, $12.00 if 7 units are produced,
and so on. Thus, in essence, the subject does not buy or acquire a public good. His "shares" in the good are "sold" to
the experimenter at the end of the experiment for money.
This is his payoff.
(a.3) Subjects face "induced values". At the outset of the experiment they are told the costs of providing one, two, three,
or any number of units of the public good. The number of
units of the good to be "provided" is determined by the total
amount of bids by all subjects. If total bids cover the cost of
(say) 5 units, then 5 units of the public good are "provided."
If total bids cover the costs of 10 units, 10 units are provided,
and so on. 29 Subjects are aware of costs for "producing" different levels of the public good. Thus, in combination with
(a.2), subjects know the value of producing different numbers of units of the public good. The value question faced
by one subject is within the context of what all other subjects
are bidding. Finally, this valuation context does not require
subjects to "research their preferences" for the good in question. Their incentives are rather to research their strategies
for maximizing their payoffs.

are to be made. We inquire below as to evidence that might support the position that
people will actually pay amounts that they say that they will pay in the CVM. This
inquiry may be viewed as setting aside questions regarding the relevance of economic
theory for assessing the substance of CVM values.
28. V.Smith, ThePrincipleofUnanimityand Voluntary Consent in Social Choice,J. Political
Economy, 85, 1125-1139, 1977; "Incentive Compatible Experimental Processes for the
Provision of Public Goods," inV. Smith (ed.), Research in Experimental Economics (Greenwich,
CT: JAI Press, Vol. 1, 1979(a)); An Experimental Comparison of Three Public Good Decision
Mechanisms, Scandinavian J.Economics, 81,198-215,1979(b); Experiments with a Decentralized
Mechanism for Public Good Decisions, American Economic Review, 584-599, 1980.
29. In the popular 'balanced budget" version of the Unanimity Auction subjects receive
rebates of monies collected which exceed the cost of providing the number of units of
the good determined in the auction.
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(a.4) When a subject offers a WTP for some quantity of the
public good, he must actually pay his offered WTP out of the
loan.
(a.5) Each subject can veto the proposed outcome, in which
case all subjects receive no payoffs 30 and the public good is
not "produced."
The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism has been used by a
number of researchers for experiments concerned with the free-riding
behavior of subjects.3 ' The salient institutional characteristics of the
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism:
(b.1) Subjects are given an interest-free loan at the outset of
the experiment; this loan can be used to contribute to the
provision of the public good. The number of units of the public good that is "provided" is determined by dividing the
total dollar amount of bids from all subjects by the assumed
unit cost of providing the good. Thus, if bids from all subjects total $500.00 and the unit cost of providing the good is
$50.00, 10 units of the good are "provided."
(b.2) Subjects receive a monetary reward (a payoff) which
depends upon the number of units of the public good that
is produced. It may also depend on the number of subjects
participating.
(b.3) Subjects face "induced values" (see a.3 above).
(b.4) When a subject offers a WTP for some quantity of the
public good, he must actually pay his offered WTP out of the
loan.
Given the foregoing descriptions, one must ask if the valuation
institution of CVM is in any substantive way similar to those used in
these experimental institutions. In CVM, subjects are neither given a
loan as in (a.1) or (b.1), nor do they actually pay their stated WTP as
in (a.4) or (b.4). CVM subjects have no veto power concerning the outcome of the experiment as in (a.5), tbley do not receive monetary rewards determined by outcomes of the experiment as in (a.2) or (b.2),
nor are they typically given cost information as in (a.3) or (b.1). 32 Their
30. Apart from a fixed payment of about $3.00 or so for showing up at the experimental
session.
31. Examples include R. Isaac, et. al, Public Goods Provision in an Experimental
Environment,J.Public Economics, 26,51-74,1985; G.Harrison, et. al, An ExperimentalEvaluation
of Weakest-Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods, 1.PoliticalEconomy, 97, 201-225, 1989; G.
Marwell & R. Ames, Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods-I: Resources, Interest,
Group Size, and the Free-RiderProblem, Amer. J.Sociology, 84,1335-1360,1979; G.Marwell
& R. Ames, Experiments on the Provision ofPublic Goods-lI: Provision Points, Stakes, Experience,
and the Free-Rider Problem, I Amer. J. Sociology, 85, 926-937, 1980; F. Schneider & W.
Pommerehne, "On the Rationality of Free Riding: An Experiment," Quarterly J. Economics,
96, 689-704, 1981.
32. One may wish to argue, however, that a cost is implied when the dichotomous
choice approach is used in the CVM.
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values are not couched in terms of the behavior of all other subjects as
in (a.3) or (b.1) 33, nor do they face induced values as in (a.3) or (b.3).
But most importantly, one must assume that CVM subjects are motivated to research their valuation of the public good, whereas subjects
in both the Smith Auction and Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
have explicit incentives to research strategies that will maximize their
payoffs. These observations lead us to conclude that very few similarities exist between the valuation institutions used (thus far) in experimental economics and those used in CVM.
The similarity of behavior in CVM and experimental institutions
Notwithstanding the substantive differences between the valuation institutions used in most experiments and that used in CVM,
is there evidence suggesting that subject behavior in CVM is nonetheless reasonably similar to behavior observed in the Smith Auction or
the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism?
Unfortunately, there are very few studies that provide empirical results that are pertinent to this question. There are no studies that
compare free-riding behavior in CVM and Voluntary Contribution
Mechanism institutions. Two studies compare values for a public good
Brookshire
derived with the CVM and variations of the Smith Auction:
35
and Coursey 34 and Brookshire, Coursey and Schulze.
Brookshire and Coursey examined three elicitation institutions:
a field CVM, a Field Smith Auction (SAF), and a Laboratory Smith Auction (SAL). In each case they elicited willingness to accept (WTA) and
WTP valuations for the public good. The public good was "tree density" in a residential neighborhood in Fort Collins, Colorado. In the
WTP exercises, they asked subjects to value increments of 25 and 50
trees from a baseline of 200 trees in a nearby park. In the WTA exercises, they asked subjects to value decrements of 25 and 50 trees from
a baseline of 200 trees. 36 Thus, their overall experimental design consisted of three value elicitation institutions (CVM, SAF, and SAL), two
33. These contrasts of the CVM with the Smith Auction are nicely set out in the following
way. "The CVM procedure outlined previously does not ask the individual to consider
the valuation question in the context of what other individuals are bidding. Additionally,
the CVM procedure does not present information to the household pertaining to the cost
of the alternative (levels at which the public good is provided). Both of these elements
are included by necessity in a Smith auction procedure." D. Brookshire & D. Coursey,
Measuring the Value of a Public Good: An Empirical Comparison of Elicitation Procedures,
American Economic Review, 77(4), 554-566, Sept., 1987, at 559.
34. Id.
35. D. Brookshire, et. al, Experiments in tire
Solicitation of Private and Public Values, in
L. Green & J. Kagel (ed.s), Advances in Behavioral Economics, Ablex (Norwood, NJ,
1990).
36. Note that the commodities being valued in the WTA and WTP exercises are not
the same. One values a decrement from 200, the other an increment from 200. It therefore
does not follow from economic theory that WTA should approximate WTP.
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valuations bases (WTP and WTA), and two levels of change (25 and 50
trees).
Brookshire and Coursey's analyses focus on WTP and WTA disparities. Although the free-riding question was not central to their in37
quiry, their raw data allows for an assessment of this question.
Specifically, we are interested in testing the hypothesis that there is no
systematic difference between the CVM values they elicited and the
SAL values they elicited. Since the latter values employed financial incentives, they more likely reflect real economic commitments. 38 Because the underlying samples exhibit significant skewness and kurtosis,
we employ a non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test procedure to
test this hypothesis. Using the data on "final bids" in the SAL institution we derived critical probability values of 0.17 (0.3) for the CVMSAL WTP comparison and 25 (50) tree increment, and 0.00004 (0.00005)
for the CVM-SAL WTA comparison and 25 (50) tree increment. Thus
in two of the four possible comparisons these probability values suggest that the CVM and SAL institutions generate different valuations.
However, it is not appropriate to use the "final bids" in the SAL
experiments, since these did not in fact represent real economic commitments. In the SAL, subjects can always veto the proposed allocation
of payments, and indeed they did so in six of the eight SAL experiments. 39 This means that the tentative valuations used by Brookshire
and Coursey for the final round of these experiments were not what
the subjects ended up facing. Instead, they paid zero, or were compensated zero, as per the "rules of the game" for the Smith Auction.
Brookshire and Coursey used valuations that the subjects entered in
the last round, whether or not they met the group fund requirement or
were vetoed. Therefore, the real economic commitment of the subjects
in those cases was zero. If one substitutes a zero valuation for all of the
SAL experiments that failed to converge, 40 the tests reported above result in a clear rejection of the null hypothesis in all four cases at probability levels of 0.0002 or less. We therefore conclude that these field
experiments provide clear evidence that CVM values are significantly
37. We are grateful to David Brookshire and Don Coursey for making the raw data
available to us.
38. The actual amount that was contributed by the experimenters ($1500, as per supra
note 33, 560) does not seem to bear any relation to the amounts of money that subjects
actually paid or said they were willing to accept, as discussed below. It is therefore an
open issue whether the subjects viewed the SAL institution as being incredible, in the
sense of eliciting values which would not actually have any bearing on the amount of
money contributed to the field public good.

39. See supra note 33, Table 2, 562.
40. An alternative way to use these data would be to retain only the responses for
the SAL experiments that converged to some positive public good supply. However, this
approach rejects the observed fact that many subjects had a zero WTP for the public
good, as elicited using this institution. We prefer to include all valuation observations.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 34

different from Smith
auction values elicited with some financial com41
mitment involved.
Brookshire, Coursey and Schulze 42 examined WTA and WTP
for an unfamiliar public good: having to taste a foul liquid substance
for 20 seconds. If subjects did not contribute a certain amount to a group
fund in the WTP experiments, they all would have to taste this substance. In the WTA experiments, the subjects were asked to say whether
they would accept an amount that was less than a certain amount in a
group fund. If so, then they would all have to taste the substance.
The data in this study are very difficult to assess because it is
in the form of a graph with no information about standard deviations.
The hypothetical WTP CVM values (in Part I of their experiment) appear to be about 50 percent higher than their "Smith Auction" counterparts. 43 In the case of the WTA valuations, there appears to be a
more dramatic difference, with the CVM values being about 100%
higher than the "Smith Auction" values. Of course, such "eyeball" impressions have little, if any, weight, but we can do no better without
44
access to the raw data.
In summary, we find no evidence to justify the claim that CVM
values and values elicited with a Smith Auction experiment are similar.
Free riding in the CVM institution
Within the valuation institution of the CVM, does evidence
exist that demonstrates that subjects do not behave strategically? Four
45
studies are most often cited as providing such evidence: Bohm [19721,
Bohm [19841,46 Rowe, d'Arge and Brookshire 47 and Brookshire, Ives
48
and Schulze.
41. It turns out that using the actual values generated by the subjects in the SAL
experiments results in a strengthening of the conclusion of this study (supra note 33, at
565) that providing market-like financial incentives results in a reduction of loss aversion.
In fact it removes it altogether! A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the hypothesis that the

WTA and WTP values for the 25 (50) tree version of the SAL experiments are the same
has a probability value of 0.57 (0.31).
42. Supra note 35, Figure 2 at 185.

43. The institution here was actually a modification of the Smith Auction introduced
in D. Coursey & V. Smith, ExperimentalTests of an Allocation Mechanismfor Private,Public

or Externality Goods, Scandinavian J. Economics, 86, 468-484, 1984.
44. We understand from David Brookshire that these data have been accidentally
lost.

45. P.Bohm, Estimating the Demand for Public Goods: An Experiment, European Econ.
Review, 3, 111-130, June, 1972.
46. P. Bohm, Revealing Demand for an Actual Public Good, J. Public Economics, 24, 135151, 1984.

47. R. Rowe, et. al, "An Experiment on the Economic Value of Visibility," J.
Environmental Economics and Management, 7, 1-19, 1980.
48. D. Brookshire, et. al, The Valuation of Aesthetic Preferences, J. Environ. Economics
and Management, 3, 325-346, 1976.
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Bohm [19721 is a landmark study that had a great impact on
many researchers in the areas of field public good valuation and experimentation on the extent of free-riding. The commodity used in
Bohm's experiments was a closed-circuit broadcast of a new Swedish
TV program. Six elicitation procedures were used. In each case except
one, the TV program was made available and subjects in each group
allowed to see it, if aggregate WTP equaled or exceeded a known total
cost. Every subject received 50 Swedish Kroner (SEK) when arriving at
the experiment.
Bohm employed five basic procedures for valuing his commodity. In Procedure I, the subject paid according to his stated WTP.
In Procedure II, the subject paid some fraction (< 1) of stated WTP, with
the fraction determined equally for all in the group such that total costs
are just covered. In Procedure III, subjects did not know the specific
payment scheme at the time of their bid, but did know that it was a
lottery with equal probability attached to the payment schemes of Procedures I, II, IV and V. In Procedure IV, each subject paid a fixed amount
(SEK 5). In Procedure V, the subject paid nothing.
For comparison, Procedure VI was introduced in two stages.
The first stage, denoted VI:1, approximates a CVM since nothing was
said to the subject about actually being offered the opportunity to watch
the program (i.e., it was purely hypothetical). The second stage, VI:2,
involved subjects bidding for the right to see the program against what
they thought was a group of 100. This was a discriminative auction,
with the 10 highest bidders actually paying their bid and being able to
see the program.
No formal theory was provided to generate free-riding hypotheses for these procedures. Procedure I was deemed the most likely
to generate strategic under-bidding,and procedure V the most likely to
generate strategic over-bidding. 49 The other procedures, with the exception of VI, lay somewhere between these two extremes. Note also
that explicit admonitions against strategic bidding were given to subjects in procedures I, II, IV and V," Although no theory is provided for
VI:2, it can be recognized as a multiple-unit discriminative auction in
which subjects have independent and private values. It is well-known
that optimal bids for risk-neutral agents51 can be well below the true
49. Supra note 45 at 113. All of the statements about predicted directions of overbidding or under-bidding should be understood as weakly predicting the direction of
bias. Thus all of the conclusions discussed below must be similarly qualified.

50. See, supra note 45 at 119, 127-29.
51. Bohm, supra note 45 at 126, discusses the possibility of what he terms "auction
fever", in which subjects get caught up in the fight over a few objects (e.g., sports
trophies). The upshot would be a form of the "winner's curse", in which the subjects
end up paying more for the object than they, themselves, would have liked to pay ex
post. If this type of irrationality applied to these subjects then their bids might exceed
their true valuation, offsetting the logic presented in the text. We interpret the available

data on the presumption that agents are rational. A game-theoretic model of behavior
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valuation of the agent in a Nash Equilibrium, and will never exceed
the true valuation. Unfortunately, there is insufficient information to
determine how far below true valuations these optimal bids will be,
since we do not know the conjectured range of valuations. Thus, we
have relatively clear a prioripredictions of the expected bias of observed
bids in relation to true WTP for Procedures I, V and VI:2.
The major result cited from Bohm's study was that bids were
virtually identical for all institutions, averaging between SEK 7.29 and
SEK 10.33. Unfortunately, these conclusions are based on parametric
test procedures, which are unreliable given the non-Gaussian nature
of the samples.5 2 The mean contributions for Procedures I-V, VI:1 and
VI:2, respectively, were 7.6, 8.8, 7.3, 7.7, 8.4, 10.2, and 10.3 (all in SEK).
The respective medians, 5, 8, 5, 5, 7, 10 and 10, in these cases suggest
an even larger disparity between the CVM Procedure VI:l and the first
five procedures. Using a non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
procedure, we derived critical probabilities that Procedure VI:I elicited
the same values as Procedures I-V and VI:2 of 0.018, 0.24, 0.011, 0.058,
0.13 and 0.99, respectively. Procedures I-V were not significantly different than any other in this group, whereas the values elicited in Procedures VI:I and VI:2 were virtually identical. Therefore, the test results
reported above for Procedure VI:I vis-a-vis Procedures I-V are the same
in this case as well.
Given our re-analysis of Bohm's data, what can one conclude
as to the extent of free-riding, in hypothetical settings, from his experiments? Procedure VI:I is the only hypothetical institution studied
in these experiments. Comparing Procedure VI:1 and VI:2, we should
see WTP values in the former that are larger than the latter, if VI:1
elicited the true WTP and if VI:2 values understated the true WTP. However, our analysis shows that the observed WTPs in each sample are
identical, suggesting that the observed WTP in Procedure VI:1 understates true WTP. This presumes, of course, that WTP elicited in Procedure VI:2 reliably represents a rational bid below true WTP, which
presumption is weakened by evidence suggesting that subjects may
need substantial experience in auctions of this kind before they respond
rationally to their incentives. In any event, we find no support here for
the view that CVM values are the same as real economic commitments.
At conventional significance levels we cannot reject the hypothesis that the WTP elicited in Procedures V and VI:1 are different.
Since Procedure V was predicted to generate bids that exceeded true
WTP, this suggests that CVM values overstated true WTP. Note that this
conclusion differs qualitatively from the conclusion drawn above from
in auctions of this type is presented in J. Cox, V. Smith & J. Walker, Theory and Behavior

of Multiple Unit Discriminative Auctions, J. Finance, 39, 983-1010, Sept. 1984.
52. We are grateful to Peter Bohm for making the raw data available.
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a comparison of Procedures VI:A and VI:2. However, the subjects in
Procedure V were asked in the instructions not to bid strategically,
whereas the subjects in Procedures VI:A and VI:2 were not so instructed.
If the subjects actually followed their respective instructions then our
conclusion, that CVM values overstated true WTP, breaks down. Unfortunately, there is no way to know how carefully the subjects actually followed their instructions.
Finally, we can reject the hypothesis that WTP in Procedures I
and VI:l are the same. Since Procedure I is predicted to generate bids
below true WTP, this result is consistent with CVM generating true WTP
values.
We conclude that there is no basis to claim dogmatically that
Bohm [19721 showed that strategic behavior is absent in hypothetical
settings, let alone that his results can be so interpreted concerning CVM.
Depending on which pair of experiments one focusses on, we show
that one can argue with equal validity that CVM values may understate, overstate, or equal true WTP. Moreover, our conclusions rest on
the validity of the priors discussed above as to the "expected biases"
in different procedures. Bohm concluded that his results were compatible
with the view "... . that people respond in an 'irresponsible fashion'..
. to hypothetical questions."5 3 We do not see how such a strong conclusion is warranted, however. These results are important for suggesting
a methodology for attacking this problem, but it is premature to draw
too strong a conclusion in this respect 5 4
Bohm [1984155 uses two procedures that elicit a real economic
commitment from individuals, albeit under different (asserted) incentives for free-riding. The two procedures were used to extract a lower
bound and an upper bound to the true average WTP for an actual good.
Each agent in group 1 stated his individual WTP. His actual cost was
a percentage of that stated WTP, such that costs for producing the good
would be covered exactly. This percentage could not exceed 100 per53. Supra note 45 at 125.
54. These results are used by Mitchell and Carson (Supra note 8 at 147) in an effort
to generate some numbers on the "percentage of true WTP measured in experimental
studies." They use the results from procedure VI:2 as a benchmark, arguing that they
come closest to being true WTP since a real economic commitment was required (although
this was also the case for procedures I-IV). Of course, as noted above and disregarding
the "auction fever" hypothesis of Bohm (Supra note 45 at 126) the institution used in this
case would lead us to expect these observed bids to understate true valuations, but by
how much we cannot easily say. Thus, using the reported data for VI:2 as "true WTP"
results in an upward bias in the percentages Mitchell and Carson report (Supra note 8
at 147). Further, they compare the average contributions in each procedure to the average
for VI:2, resulting in numbers on the propensity to free-ride of 74 percent, 85 percent,
71 percent, 74 percent and 85 percent for procedures I-V, respectively. The raw data are
not particularly symmetric, however, and medians tend to be much lower than means
in all of these cases. If one uses the ratio of medians instead of means these propensities
drop to 50 percent, 70 percent, 50 percent, 65 percent, and 70 percent, respectively. These
are also inflated values since the values for VI:2 are biased down from their true values.
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cent. Subjects in group 2 aslo stated their WTP. If the interval estimated
for total stated WTP equalled or exceeded the (known) total cost, the
good was to be provided and subjects in group 2 would pay only SEK
500. Subjects bidding zero in group 1, or below SEK 500 in group 2,
would be excluded from enjoying the good.
In group 1, a subject only had an incentive to understate if he
conjectured that the sum of the contributions of others in his group
was greater than or equal to the total cost minus his true valuation for
the good. Total cost was known by all subjects to be SEK 200,000, but
each subject had to speculate as to the contributions of the others in
his group. Unfortunately, it is not possible to say what the extent of
free-riding was in this case without further information as to expectations that were not observed. In group 2, only those subjects who actually stated a WTP greater than or equal to SEK 500 had an incentive
to free-ride. Forty-nine subjects reported exactly SEK 500 in group 2,
whereas 93 reported a WTP of SEK 500 or higher. Thus the extent of
free-riding in group 2 could be anywhere from 0 percent (if those reporting SEK 500 indeed had a true WTP of exactly that amount) to 53
percent (49 free-riders out of 93 possible free-riders).
The main result reported by Bohm [19841 is that the average
WTP interval between the two groups was quite small. Group 1 had
an average WTP of SEK 827 and group 2 an average WTP of SEK 889,
for an interval that is only 7.5 percent of the smaller average WTP of
group 1. Thus, one can conclude that, if free-riding incentives were
56
present in this experiment, they did not materially affect the outcome.
One can question, however, the extent to which these results can be
generalized. The subjects were representatives of local governments,
and it was announced that all reported WTP values would be published. This is not a feature of most CVM studies, which often go to
great lengths to ensure confidentiality. Thus, while the Bohm [19841
experiment provides evidence that free-riding behavior was absent
where WTP involved a real economic commitment, the results do not
transfer without qualification to the CVM.

55. Supra note 46.
56. The following calculation suggests this conclusion. The average WTP of the 50
percent of the population of 274 subjects who had an incentive to understate their WTP
(group 1) was 7.5 percent below the average WTP of the remaining 50 percent who had
an incentive to overstate their WTP (group 2). Adjusting for sampling error with a 95
percent one-sided confidence interval, the average WTP of the whole population, if placed
in group 1, would be at most 32 percent below the average WTP of the whole population
if placed in group 2. Although this 32 percent represents the combined effect of the
understatement incentive in group I and the overstatement incentive in group 2, the
free-rider (or understatement) incentive could still account for (at most) this 32 percent,
assuming that nobody responded to the overstatement incentive. We are grateful to Peter
Bohm for this interpretation of his data.
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Brookshire, Ives and Schulze 7 (hereafter, BIS) undertake a series of CVM exercises designed, in part, to test for the importance of
strategic behavior. They offer an explicit model of the chain of logic
that a subject could conceivably go through when deciding whether or
not to respond truthfully, and then propose to test for it indirectly. They
posit:
"If respondents in our example assume the mean bid of the sample survey is used to set the entrance fee and an individual with
perfect information has an 'honest bid' greater than the mean
bid, there exists an incentive to make a false high bid to bias
the sample mean upward." (emphasis added) 8
These are crucial assumptions that are not obviously applicable to any
CVM, unless they are built in by design, as in Rowe, d'Arge and Brookshire. 59 Given these assumptions, BIS
".... undertake to demonstrate that strategic behavior, when

carefully analyzed in the context of our particular bidding
us
game, can be easily recognized. This, in turn, will enable
60
to make an evaluation of the extent of the problem."
The specific bidding game proposed by BIS assumed that each individual had perfect information with respect to the average bid of all
others in the CVM. 61 Two further implicit assumptions were (i) that
CVM responses actually had some influence on the social decision, and
(ii) that none of the other individuals were able to revise their bids after
the subject in question gives his bid. In effect, this last assumption means
that all subjects were expected to rationally conjecture what the mean
as stated, could
bid of the other respondents was, since the assumption,
62
only be generally true for the last respondent.
Thus far in the argument one can appreciate the rationale for
the assumptions, if one is to be able to say anything about strategic behavior without a reference valuation institution (such as a Vickrey auction). One can even imagine setting up a CVM in which these assumptions
are met. However, BIS added a final assumption for which a rationale
was not developed: that true valuations are distributed normally. Specifically:
57. Supra note 48.
58. Supra note 48 at 327.
59. Supra note 47.
60. Supra note 48 at 327, 328.
61. Supra note 48 at 328,
62. BIS have some discussion (Supra Note 48, at 328) about preferences being identical
across all individuals, but this is simply an analytical vehicle to work in the assumption
that the respondent in question knows the mean bid of everybody else (since he knows
his own bid). Identical preferences is surely less palatable than making the direct
assumption that the respondent conjectures the mean bid of everybody else, since this
allows some heterogeneity of preferences from the outset.
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"If we assume that honest bids are distributed normally, bias
of the type discussed above will tend to 'flatten' the distribution dramatically. This implies substantial numbers of
very high and very low bids relative to the mean bid if dishonest responses constitute a significant fraction of the sur63
vey."
Turning to the actual survey, the respondents were not given
the sample mean. Indeed, the WTP question was posed with no qualifying information as to the bids of others. 64 Hence the authors relied
on the respondents behaving as if they correctly conjectured the sample mean.
Evaluating the data, they conclude:
"Examining the distribution of bids [... ], we note that it is
not flat in either the total grouping or the disaggregated
65
cases."
Unfortunately, this conclusion was not based on statistics that might
suggest negative kurtosis, 66 which is the prediction of their strategic
behavior hypothesis. One cannot generally rely on "eyeball assessments" of sample data distributions in this manner to draw reliable
statistical conclusions, hence the BIS conclusion is not well supported.
Thus, while an imaginative effort to investigate the possibility of strategic behavior in CVM, the BIS "distributional model" does not provide
a basis for unequivocal conclusions regarding such behavior.
Rowe, d'Arge and Brookshire 67 (hereafter, RDB), following the
suggestion of BIS, 68 actually gave the sample mean information to respondents to see if they wanted to revise their bid. A subject who revised his bid was presumed to be acting strategically. RDB's approach,
unlike that of BIS, is a plausible means by which one might meaningfully extend the assumptions of BIS by "hard-wiring" them into the
CVM design. Indeed, RDB correctly recognized the problems with the
simple BIS model of strategic behavior:
"....

for the individual to accomplish this goal [of strategic

bidding], a great deal of information is necessary. For instance, the sample size, the previous bids, and whether or
not they are the last respondent are necessary to bid strate69
gically with an assured outcome."
63. Id. at 329.
64. Id. at 334
65. Supra Note 48 at 340.
66. It is not clear whether or not the data reported in Figure 7 (Supra note 48 at 341)
of BIS reflects all of the raw data. Rowe, d'Arge and Brookshire [Supro note 47 at 151, in
discussing their "trimming" procedures, imply that the same procedures were used in
BIS. If this is the case, such trimming would bias the results against the proposed
hypothesis of strategic bidding.
67. Supra note 47.
68. Supra note 48 at 345.
69. Supro note 47 at 6.
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To overcome these informational problems, RDB gave 40 subjects the mean bid of the other (supposed) bidders and then told them
that each would ultimately pay the average bid, and not their own.
However, RDB did not specify whether they gave these subjects information on the full sample size, or whether or not a given subject was
the last respondent. Such information is important. For example, if the
subject is just one respondent in an arbitrarily large group, then he has
little hope of shifting the mean, no matter what he bids.7° Similarly, if
the subject is included among the first few respondents, and there are
many more to follow, he can scarcely affect the average one way or the
other.
Turning to the data, we are concerned with the use of the automatic "trimming" procedure used by RDB to eliminate data which
could support the hypothesis of strategic bidding:
"First, as in all results reported in this paper, zero bids were
analyzed, under criteria suggested by Randall et al. and Brookshire et al., where bids greater than 10 SD from the mean were
71
deleted."
This procedure could have significantly affected the results of RDB. Although RDB do not report the results with or without the use of the
procedure, their conclusion hints that it did make a difference:
"... if zero and large bids are closely analyzed and possibly
rejected, strategic bias, if it exists, has a negative effect upon
72
the bid distribution."
Furthermore, the actual analysis of these data was complicated by the
presence of many different treatments in the one design, making it difficult to test directly the hypothesized negative kurtosis of the bid distribution with strategic bidding. Instead, they performed a regression
analysis to test for the significance of any interaction of a dummy representing "being environmentally inclined" and a dummy for "provision of the sample mean. ' They found no significant interaction for
either dummy variable, and concluded that significant strategic behavior
was absent. However, it is not clear why this interaction term should
have a non-zero expected value under the hypothesis of strategic behavior. If, for example, there were as many pro-environmental as antienvironmental respondents in this group of 40, their bid deviations could
be offsetting.
The RDB study was an imaginative effort to extend the earlier
inquiry of BIS. Like the BIS study, however, it explores the possible use
70. Implicitly this line of argument assumes that the agent feels constrained not to
give "incredibly large" bids, perhaps because he rationally fears that such "outliers"
will be dropped.
71. Supra note 47 at 15.
72. Supro note 47, at 15.
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of a method for identifying strategic behavior that has no apparent theoretical or empirical rationale. Therefore, one cannot appeal to the results from either study as having established the presence or absence
of strategic behavior in CVM.
Free-riding in the experimental literature: A digression
Given that the CVM valuation institution is substantively
dissimilar, to those used in experimental economics, and that there is
no firm basis for arguing that behavior in these two sets of institutions
is similar, we have argued that one cannot readily justify drawing
inferences from findings in experimental economics to subject behavior
in CVM. Regardless of their direct relevance to CVM, the question
remains as to what one might conclude from studies of free-riding
behavior conducted in experimental economics. In this regard we are
interested in the question: are findings of an absence of pervasive freeriding in experimental studies as monolithic as suggested by citations
of the type exemplified above?
In terms of the free-riding behavior of subjects, applications of
the Smith Auction are mixed and clearly do not support the general
conclusion that free-riding is absent. Two factors in particular render
such a conclusion false. First, the fact that the collective decision tends
to be the efficient one when there is agreement does not mean that each
individual has truthfully revealed his preferences, which is what
incentive-compatibility or "demand revelation" require. As V.L. Smith
points out very clearly:
"....

the mean bids differ from the corresponding Lindahl

equilibrium bids..Consequently, although the Auction Mechanism provides public good quantities that approximate the
Lindahl equilibrium quantity the private good allocations
do not approximate the Lindahl equilibrium quantities. [This]
is because subjects with low endowment [ ... I tend to contribute less, while subjects with high endowment [... I con73
tribute more, than is required for a Lindahl allocation."
These results are quite general to the many other induced-value experiments conducted with the Smith Auction. 74 What they mean is that
some individuals over-contribute and others under-contribute, and
that they do not do so at random.
Second, the success rate of the Smith Auction is not high. When
the group fails to come to an agreement in the induced-value control
experiments, at least one subject has not revealed his preferences truth73. Smith 11979(b)), supra note 28 at 208.
74. See, for example, Banks, et al., "An Experimental Analysis of Unanimity in Public
Goods Provision Mechanisms," Rev. Economic Studies, 55, 301-322, 1988, at 314.
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fully. Smith [1979(a)] found a failure rate of about 10 percent, 75 Smith
[1979(b)] a failure rate of 20 percent, 76 and Banks, Plott and Porter 7 a
failure rate of 50 percent. When one allows for these failures the efficiency of the Smith Auction is statistically about the same as a direct
contribution mechanism for which free-riding is predicted and confirmed.
The clearest example of this last result was provided in Smith
[1979(b)1. 78 The average contribution for 10 experiments was 9.10 units
with the Smith Auction. The average contribution was 7.3 units using
a different mechanism for which free-riding is predicted was used.
However, the average reported for the Smith Auction excludes those experiments which failed to reach agreement. The study points out that
the average for the Smith Auction drops from 9.10 to 7.9 if the disagreement outcomes are included and given a value of 3.33 (which is
the theoretical free-riding prediction). If one includes disagreement
outcomes and assigns them their actual value, zero, one obtains an unconditional average provision level of only 6.3 for the Smith Auction,
which is below the average provision level of the free-rider procedure
(7.3). On the other hand, Banks, Plott and Porter 79 report significantly
higher (unconditional) provision levels with the Smith Auction than
with a free-rider mechanism. The appropriate conclusion is that the efficiency of the Smith Auction is sensitive to the specific environment
in which it is used. Strategic behavior is observed in some, but not all,
environments.
The implications of results from applications of the Voluntary
Contribution Mechanism for free-riding behavior are also inconclusive.
There exists a set of studies using the Voluntary Contribution
Mechanism that report results showing very little free-riding behavior on the part of subjects. Most notable among these studies are
82
8l
Chamberlin, 80 Marwell and Ames , and Schneider and Pommerehne.
For example, Schneider and Pommerehne [1981; p. 7021 conclude that
"[...J individuals did systematically behave as free riders [... ]but
the extent to which free riding occurred was not great."8 3 Since these

attention in Mitchell and Carson, we will
studies are given detailed 84
not repeat that detail here.
75. Supra note 28.
76. Id.
77. Supra note 74.
78. Supra note 28, Table 5 at 207.
79. Supra note 74, Table I at 316.
80. J. Chamberlin, "Provision of Collective Goods as a Function of Group Size," Amer.
PoliticalScience Review, 68, 707-716, 1974.
81. Supra note 31.
82. Supra note 31.
83. Supra note 31 at 702.
84. Supra note 8 at 133-136, 139-143 and 146-148. We note other studies cited in these
regards by Mitchell and Carson [at 1351 in support of their argument that voluntary
demand revelation mechanisms might "outperform" incentive compatible mechanisms:
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There also exists a good number of other studies which draw
diametrically opposite conclusions.8 5 As examples, Isaac, McCue and Plott
find pervasive free riding. 86 Actual contributions by subjects as a percent of true (induced) valuations were only 37, 19, 12, 9 and 9 percent
in five separate trials. Harrison and Hirshliefer also found pervasive
free-riding behavior in their experiments with the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. 87 Subject contributions as a percent of true (induced) values for all trials averaged only 32 percent. Further, Harrison
and Hirshliefer's theoretically-based prediction for "perfect" free riding represents a situation in which the subjects still contribute 33 percent of their true values (and not 0 percent). 88 Thus their findings were
consistent with the perfect free riding prediction. Along similar lines,
Kim and Walker conclude that "Free riding behavior in the reported
experiment was overwhelming, systematic, and very much in accord
with economic theory." 89 Other studies involving applications of the
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism that report results similar to those
given above include Andreoni, 90 and Isaac, Walker and others.9 1
If one focuses solely on the studies of Chamberlin, 92 Marwell
and Ames, 93 and Schneider and Pommerehne, 94 one might reasonably
conclude that there is very little free riding in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. However, when these studies are viewed within
Scherr, B. and E. Babb, "Pricing Public Goods: An Experiment with Two Proposed Pricing
Systems," Public Choice, 35-48, 1975; and Grether, et al., "Economic theory of Choice and
the Preference Reversal Phenomenon," American Economic Review, 69,623-638, September,
1979. Sherr and Babb do nct use induced values, so they have no basis by which strategic
bidding can be identified in either their control group or in the group which participates
in a form of a Pivot Mechanism experiment. References to Grether and Plott as providing
"evidence" related to free-riding must be viewed as gratuitous: Grether and Plott do not
address this issue.
85. Referring to the studies cited above that find little free-riding, Kim and Walker
observe that "The outcome furthermore suggests that an explanation of the previous,
contrary experimental results [which refute the free-rider hypothesis) is likely to be found
in one or more of the invalidating factors that were present in previous experiments."
0. Kim, and M. Walker, "The Free Riding Problem: Experimental Evidence," Public
Choice, 43, 3-24, 1984 at 5.
86. Supra note 31, Table 2 at 61.
87. Supra note 31, Table 7 at 216.
88. Id. at 218.
89. Supra note 85 at 4.
90. Andreoni, J., "Privately Provided Public Goods in a Large Economy: The Limits
of Altruism," J. Public Economics, 35, 57-73, February, 1988.
91. See R.M. Isaac, and J. Walker, "Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism," Quarterly!. Economics, 103, 179-199, February, 1988;
R.M. Isaac, and J. Walker, "Communication and Free-Riding: The Voluntary Contribution
Mechanism," Economnic Inquiry, 26,585-608, October, 1988; Isaac, R.M. and I. Walker, "On
the Suboptimality of Voluntary Public Goods Provision: Further Experimental Evidence,"
in R.M. Isaac (ed.) Research in Experimental Economics, (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, Vol. 4,
1991); and Isaac, R.M., J.Walker and S. Thomas, "Divergent Evidence on Free Riding:
An Experimental Examination of Possible Explanations," PublicChoice, 43, 113-149, 1984.
92. Supro note 80.
93. Supra note 31.
94. Id.
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the context of all the relevant literature, it is clear that monolithic "conclusions" one way or the other are simply not justified.
We conclude that the conventional wisdom accepted by many
CVM researchers, that "evidence" exists which justifies the general expectation that CVM subjects will not engage in strategic behavior, lacks
a substantive foundation. Valuation institutions used in experimental
economics are very different from those used in CVM. There is no unequivocal evidence suggesting that subject behavior in CVM is sufficiently "like" subject behavior in experimental institutions. Nor does
there exist a body of studies that unequivocally demonstrates the lack
of pervasive strategic behavior in valuation institutions used in CVM
or those used in experimental economics.
Furthermore, the "incentives issue" is not limited to speculation as to whether or not CVM subjects truthfully report their values.
Let us suppose that subjects do not behave strategically, and that sub95
jects are "sincere" in their responses in the truth-telling sense of Zippo.
Indeed, our experiences with applications of CVM leaves us with the
feeling that some subjects do not purposefully lie (we have no proof
one way or another, of course). The relevance of the incentives issue
nonetheless remains. With the good and the payment hypothetical, we
must ask a question that parallels the court's concern with "dangers of
faulty perceptions:" what incentives do subjects have to make good
choices, to undertake the process of researching their preferences to the
end of determining what they would really be willing to pay for the
good in question?
The core of the incentives or perceptions issue may be seen in
the following question: do people generally make the same kinds of
valuations when asked what they might pay for something as they do
when they must pay? Arrow finds "....

the hypothetical bias concern-

ing payment more serious than that about commodities. This is the concern of those who follow the economists' tradition which criticizes
hypothetical questions. Verbal answers don't hurt the way cash pay96
ments do."
An empirical basis for such concern is suggested by results of
Kealy, Montgomery and Dovidio. 97 They examined the hypothesis that
preferences are the same among the two groups of subjects, one that is
asked for hypothetical payment and one that is asked for actual payment. They reject this hypothesis, a result which they interpret as suggesting that ". . . in the hypothetical situation preferences are less well

formulated because subjects have less incentives to seriously contemplate
their actual willingness to pay." 98 (p. 257, emphasis added)
95. Supro note 11.
96. Arrow, K.J., "Comments," pp. 180-186 in Cummings, et al, Supra note 8 at 183.
97. Kealy, et al., "Reliability and Predictive Validity of Contingent Values: Does the
Nature of the Good Matter?" ). Environ. Economnics and Management, 19, 244-263, 1990.
98. Id. at 257.
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As another, perhaps more indirect, example, Smith and Desvousges 9 9 find significant differences in marginal valuations of risk with
declining risk levels that result from changing information relating to

baseline risks of premature death. Economic theory would predict that
an individual's values for additional incremental reductions in risk would
decline as baseline risk levels decline. This is a simple application of
the principle of diminishing marginal utility. However, Smith and

Desvousges', in their application of CVM, found increasing marginal
valuations for risk reductions as baseline risk levels are reduced.10 0
Were these CVM subjects "irrational," or did subjects simply have less
incentives to seriously contemplate their actual willingness to pay? In
our view, one would look to the latter hypothesis to explain the behavior observed in the Smith and Desvousges [1987] experiment. 1 1

CVM VALUES AND REAL ECONOMIC COMMITMENTS
As we argue above, no empirical evidence conclusively establishes whether or not CVM subjects behave strategically, or the extent
to which they lack incentives to "sincerely" contemplate their willingness

to pay for an environmental improvement. However, one might nonetheless take the position that even though the theoretical basis for CVM
is not so "solid," it "works" anyway. Referring to the possibility of

strategic behavior, perhaps institutions don't matter, or perhaps CVM
subjects do not behave strategically. Theory and institutions aside, per-

haps CVM still yields values which reflect real economic commitments.
Such a methodological position is not without precedent in
economics. In response to criticisms of the relevance of value theory,
Friedman 102 argues that our models may be valid even if one or more
of the assumptions underlying them are not. If behavior predicted by
the model reasonably approximates actual behavior, then the model is
a legitimate tool for empirical analysis until a better model is developed.
99. V.K. Smith, and W.l. Desvousges, "An Empirical Analysis of the Economic Value
of Risk Changes," ].Political Economy, 95, 89-114, February, 1987.
100. More precisely, subjects were randomly assigned baseline risk levels. The
theoretical expectation would be that subjects assigned low baseline risk levels would
value a given reduction in risk less than subjects valuing the same risk reduction but
assigned higher baseline risk levels. Similar results are reported in Jones-Lee, M.W., M.
Hammerton and P.R. Philips, "The Value of Safety: Results of a National Sample Survey,"
Economic Journal, 95, 49-72, March, 1985. In this study more than 40% of subjects gave
the same values for different levels of risk reduction (p. 67, section B.a). Overall, however,
responses to some questions reflect consistency with diminishing marginal utility (see,
e.g., p. 66, result A.c).
101. We acknowledge a range of other possible explanations for these observations.
Any or all of the many other problems with the CVM discussed in this report may be
relevant for explaining the observations.
102. Friedman, M., "The Methodology Of Positive Economics," in M. Friedman,
Essays in Positive Economics, University of Chicago Press (Chicago, 1953), at 15.
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To the end of examining this general position, we begin with a
brief discussion of studies that compare CVM results with results from
indirect estimation methods. We then examine results from studies that
directly ask if subjects actually pay amounts that they say they will in
the CVM.
Comparing CVM results with results from indirect estimation
methods
One set of efforts designed to assess the validity of CVM values focuses on comparisons with values derived using estimation methods that essentially rely on values indirectly implied by consumer
behavior. The methods most often used for such comparisons are variations of the Travel Cost Method (TCM) and the Hedonic Price Method
(HPM). 10 3 Summaries of these studies and their
results are found in
105
Cummings, et al.' 0 4 and Mitchell and Carson.
The similarity between value estimates derived using CVM and
indirect methods for some environmental goods is remarkable. For example, Cummings et al. 10 6 estimated values associated with the provision
103. The relevance of studies comparing results from a CVM with those from the
TCM or HPM for the question of interest here, whether or not CVM values reflect a real
economic commitment, is at best indirect. Suppose that one obtains value measures with
applications of the CVM and the HPM for a particular environmental good. Suppose
further that statistical analyses result in the rejection of the hypothesis that the two values
are different; i.e., the CVM value is statistically indistinguishable from the HPM value
within some confidence limits. Does this finding establish that the CVM has yielded a
"true" or "accurate" value for this particular good, in the sense of a value that reflects
a real economic commitment? Of course, the response to this question is: only if one is
prepared to assert that the HPM value'is "true," "accurate," or reflects a real economic
commitment. Few, if any, would be prepared to defend such an assertion, however. This
is to say that we have no basis for knowing in any precise way the relationship between
HPM values or TCM values and real economic commitments that subjects may be willing
to make for public goods. Thus V.K. Smith [in Cummings, et al., Supra note at 174) correctly
notes that "Comparisons of indirect IHPM and TCM] and CVM estimates are largely
useless unless we can bound the nature of the errors associated with the indirect estimates."
Mitchell and Carson [Supra note 8, at 188 and 1901 note that "Although suggestive, these
comparisons have their limitations...it is well recognized that estimates based on the
indirect methods...are themselves prone to error, owing to that fact that their indirect
relationship with the good being valued necessarily requires the use of largely arbitrary
assumptions to arrive at a WTP amount...convergent validity involves comparing two
estimates, neither of which can be assumed to represent the unmeasured variable.
Although it is reassuring when the two measures of the same concept are close to one
another, the possibility exists that both are inaccurate." All of this is to simply say that
a showing that CVM values for a particular good are "close" to those derived with an
indirect estimation method obviously demonstrates no more than that the two methods
yield similar results. While such a showing may be interesting, it does not provide
conclusive evidence that the CVM has captured a real economic commitment by subjects.
104. Supra note 8 at Chapter 6.
105. Supra note 8 at Chapter 9.
106. R. Cummings, et al., "Measuring the Elasticity of Substitution of Wages for
Municipal Infrastructure: A Comparison of the Survey and Wage Hedonic Approach,"
1. Environmental Econ. Management, 13, 269-276, 1986.
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of municipal infrastructure in boomtowns using HPM and CVM. They
failed to reject the hypothesis that mean values for the elasticity of substitution between wages and municipal infrastructure calculated from
the two methods are the same. Smith, et al.10 7 found a close correspondence between values for water quality derived using CVM and
a "simple" TCM model. In 13 of 15 comparison studies considered by
were within +/-50 percent of values deCummings, et al., CVM values
10 8
rived with indirect methods.
However, in a number of other cases, CVM values were not
"close" to values derived from indirect methods. This observation led
Cummings, Brookshire and Schulze10 9 to ask: are there common characteristics among goods for which CVM and indirect value estimates
are "close" and those for which CVM and indirect values are not close?
They loosely suggest that such might be the case. Drawing on the paradigm of a perfectly competitive market, they defined as "Reference
Operating Conditions" (ROCs) a subject's familiarity with a commodity, their valuation or choice experience with the commodity, little uncertainty as to the attributes of the commodity, and the use of a WTP
measure.110 They then suggested that a parallel exists between goods
that satisfy these ROCs and those for which CVM values were found
to be "close" (within +/-50 percent) to values derived with indirect
methods.
Unfortunately, Cummings, Brookshire and Schulze's view of
the implications of this parallel does not help to determine the extent
to which CVM values reflect real economic commitments. Values from
an estimation study in which ROCs are in some (undefined) sense satisfied would seemingly be accepted as "true" or "accurate" by them.'"
They appear to assume that indirect methods may be taken on their
face as having satisfied the ROCs. Thus, they appear to view closeness
of CVM values to those derived using indirect methods to imply closeness of CVM values to "true" values reflecting a real economic commitment. We have noted above the absence of any basis for this line of
deduction, a "lack" noted by others." 2 The "reference accuracy" dis107, V.K. Smith, W.H. Desvousges and A. Fisher, "Estimating Environmental Benefits,"

Amer. 1. Agricultural Econ., 68, 280-290, May, 1986.
108. Supra note 8, 100-101.
109. Supra note 8 at Chapter 6.
110. Id. 8 at 102-105.
111. This would certainly appear to be the case in their discussions of the ROCs
(Cummings, et al., supra note at Chapter 6). However, in Chapter 13 (pp. 230-231), the
authors acknowledge the infant stage of our knowledge of criteria for accuracy in CVM
measures, discuss other possible ROCs, and call for "...imaginative thinking and research
relevant to the specification of precise and defensible ROCs." (p. 230)
112. "...there are no grounds for considering travel cost- or hedonic price-based measures
to be more accurate than CV-based measures." Mitchell and Carson (supra note at 204).
See also the critique of V.K. Smith (in Cummings, et al., supra note 8) and R. Mitchell
and R. Carson, "Evaluating the Validity of Contingent Valuation Studies," in G. Peterson,
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cussions of Cummings, Brookshire and Schulze may be viewed as historically useful as a call for the economics profession's attention to be
focused on means by which the accuracy and reliability of CVM measures might be assessed. Much more work is required, however, to de"conditions" required for any criterion
termine the nature of possible
3
for reference accuracy."
For the time being, the results from comparative studies offer
little evidence regarding the extent to which real economic commitments are reflected in CVM values.
CVM values and real economic commitments
We now examine the extent to which CVM values have been shown
to approximate actualamounts that people are willing to pay for a good.
However, "hard" evidence relevant to this question as it applies to environmental goods is very limited, which reflects the fact that received
valuation methods cannot generally be applied to non-deliverable public goods (e.g., we cannot actually auction hypothesized improvements
in air quality). This limitation raises an obvious question: can one extrapolate relationships between a CVM and a "real" value that are
found in experiments with private goods to public, environmental
goods?
Most researchers asserting that CVM values are at least "reasonable" emphasize the importance of the subject's familiarity with the
good. Mitchell and Carson argue that "The key problem facing the designer of a CV study, we say, is the novelty of valuing a public good,
given the respondents' varying degrees of familiarity with the good
being valued and how they currently pay for its provision." 114 If one
accepts this argument, and set aside other problems with CVM, one
could argue that the hallmark of a "good" CVM design is making the
subject as familiar as possible with the good being valued.1 1 5 A "perfect" design would then be one where the subject is demonstrably familiar with the good. Common, private goods surely meet this criterion.
B.Driver and R. Gregory (ed.s), Amenity Resource Valuation:Integrating Economics with
Other Disciplines (State College, PA: Venture Publishing Co., 1988), at 188-90.
113. Among others, Mitchell and Carson (supra note 8, at 189) argue that a political
market model may be preferable to a consumer market model for the valuation of public
goods. This preference is justified on the grounds that people value public programs
and amenities in referenda. They argue that "Acceptance of a referendum model would
imply quite different ROCs; for example voters often make binding choices about
amenities with which they have relatively slight familiarity." As discussed above the
key descriptor here is "binding,' which implies that individuals view the referendum
as real. The weight of this argument when applied to a hypothetical referendum where
the good to be provided and payment for the good is hypothetical is debatable. See
Cummings and Harrison, supra note 8, at 59-62, for further critical discussion.
114. Supra note 8 at 188.
115. Many commentators assert that CVM values are likely to be more "reliable" and
"valid" if the subject is familiar with the commodity. We are aware of no theory, however,
that relates the degree of familiarity with the quality of a subject's valuation process.
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If the CVM values for such goods do not closely approximate their real
values, how can one expect a better predictive performance of CVM
when the good being valued is unfamiliar? Thus, for the limited purposes of this section's inquiry, results from private-good experiments
may be every bit as meaningful as results from studies that involve
public goods.
Private Goods
Dickie, Fisher and Gerkingl1 6 obtained values for a pint of
strawberries by using CVM, and by actually selling the strawberries
to households. They concluded 117 that they could not reject the null
hypothesis of structurally identical demand equations estimated from
actual sales and CVM data. However, their results are mixed if one examines them in further detail. Specifically, they found that there were
large differences in the actual and hypothetical demand schedules
using the predicted demand equations based on their regression results. 118 Depending on the price one uses, the hypothetical demand
curve can overstate the quantity demanded from 351.4 percent to 68.6
percent, if all interview team results are included. Even if an errant
team's results are excluded, the two can differ by as much as 100 percent or as little as 3.5 percent, again depending on the particular price
evaluated.
Another problem with the general conclusion of Dickie, Fisher
and Gerking's study is that it rests heavily on the deletion of one outlier. Apparently, 119 one happy customer said he would buy 10 pints of
strawberries at a price of 60 cents, and that he planned to freeze or can
50 percent of them. What makes this an outlier? The question actually
asked of subjects did not ask what the current consumption demand
was, so there is no obvious basis for calling this an outlier. With it included, the total hypothetical and real expenditures per head are, on
average, about 58 percent different. We conclude, therefore, that there
is hardly unequivocal support in this study for the view that hypothetical and actual questions generate the same demand schedules.
Furthermore, a number of other studies involving "familiar"
goods demonstrate there may be significant differences between CVM
values and market values. Bishop and Heberlein' 20 found significant
differences between CVM estimates for subjects' WTA for goose per116. M. Dickie, A. Fisher and S. Gerking, "Market Transactions and Hypothetical
Demand Data: A Comparative Study," 1.Amer. Statistical Ass., 82, 69-75, 1987.
117. 116 at 75.
118. 116 at Tables 3 and 4, and Figure 1 at 74.

119. 116 at p. 71.
120. Supra note 17 at 929-929.
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mits and WTA values based upon actual cash payments. 12 1 In a later
study, Bishop and Heberlein 122 obtained CVM and actual cash values
for deer permits, and found that WTP values were significantly overstated in the CVM relative to the cash market. Referring to the "familiarity" requirement for real economic commitment in CVM values, they
note that "Clearly, if contingent valuation is capable of giving unbiased estimates of real values, it should have done so here." 123 However, their results:
"... indicate bias. People were more willing to sell their goose
hunting permits for real dollars than they indicated they
would be in the contingent market. Preliminary results from
the deer study indicate that in an auction framework, CVM
will overestimate willingness to pay [... I money is a powerful stimulus and real money is more powerful than hypo24
thetical money."1
Sellar, Stoll and Chavas [19851125 offered evidence concerning
the real economic commitment of CVM values for private goods. They
used CVM to obtain WTP values for improvements in boat docking facilities in four lakes in Eastern Texas. Values are derived with a TCM
model, an open-ended CVM study, and a dichotomous choice CVM
study. Two results from this study are of interest for our purposes, although the evidence presented is very weak. 126 First, both CVM applications yielded a demand relationship with a positive slope for one
of the lakes (Lake Somerville). The explanation offered for this anomaly bears on the "familiarity" issue. Specifically, the researchers noted:
"It appears that specifying a contingent market under conditions where boaters were not used to paying a launch fee
may have caused problems [... I This seems to add to the
evidence that the contingent valuation instruments used to
collect data for analysis must be designed so that behavior
12 7
by the respondent is as familiar as possible."
121. Mitchell and Caison, Supra Note 8 at p. 195-199, dispute these conclusions.
Hanemann, M., "Welfare Evaluations in Contingent Valuation Experiments with Discrete
Responses," Amer. ]. Agricultural Econ. 66,332-341, 1984, also re-evaluates the conclusions
of Bishop and Heberlein's study, demonstrating the extreme sensitivity of results to
alternative statistical assumptions.
122. In Cummings, et al., supra note 8, at Chapter 8 (130-11, particularly).
123. Id. at 134.
124. Id.
125. C. Sellar, J. Stoll and J. Chavas, "Valuation of Empirical Measures of Welfare
Change: A Comparison of Nonmarket Techniques," Land Econ., 61, 156-175, 1985.
126. Sellar, et al., "Specification of the Logit Model: The Case of Valuation of Nonmarket
Goods," J, Environ. Econ. Management, 13, 382-390, December, 1986, demonstrate that the
anomalous results obtained from data concerning Lake Conroe, discussed below, are
attributable to a mis-specification of the estimation model used for analyses reported in
the earlier 1985 study. The implicationsof such model mis-specification for results related
to value estimates for the remaining three lakes are unclear, but suggests the need to
view all of the results in the 1985 study with healthy skepticism.
127. Supra note 125 at 169, 174.
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Secondly, CVM values from their open format questionnaire resulted
in negative surplus measures for two of the lakes (Lake Conroe and
Lake Houston). These results, along with similar results from a third
lake (Lake Livingston), indicated to Sellar, Stoll and Chavas that "...
people reported they were willing to pay less for an annual ramp permit than they already paid in total launch fees over the year on a per
128
visit basis."
Boyce et al. 129 used experimental methods to elicit WTA and
WTP for a Norfolk Pine tree, which is a small house plant. In one set
of experiments subjects were told that if they did not buy the tree (the
WTP case), or sell it back to the experimenter (the WTA case), the tree
would be destroyed "then and there." In another case, subjects were
asked WTA and WTP for a tree, but were told nothing about the disposition of the trees left in the hands of the experimenters. They also
elicited CVM values from the same subjects. Given the data they report on sample means and medians, one can easily gauge the relationship
between hypothetical CVM values and values that represented real economic commitments. Using means from their data, hypothetical CVM
values over-stated real economic commitments by 27 percent, 117 percent, 85 percent and 150 percent in the WTP-NoKill, WTP-Kill, WTANoKill, and WTA-Kill experiments, respectively. Using median values,
which is arguably more reliable given the likely skewness of the data,
CVM values over-stated real economic commitments by much larger
percentages: 82 percent, 150 percent, 150 percent and 400 percent, respectively. These data suggest that values elicited with CVM can be
highly inflated with respect to real economic commitments.
Neill, Cummings, Ganderton, Harrison, and McGuckinl 30 investigated the extent to which subjects will actually pay the amounts
they said that they would in a CVM. They conducted two series of experiments. In the first, they compare the valuations elicited for a small,
framed painting of a Southwest rural scene by an unknown Navajo Indian painter using a CVM and a Vickrey auction. The subjects were re131
quired to actually pay for the painting out of their own pockets.
128. Id. at 169.
129. R. Boyce, T. Brown, G. McClelland, G. Peterson and W. Schulze, "Experimental
Evidence of Existence Value in Payment and Compensation Contexts," in Boyle, K. and
T. Heekin (ed.s), Western Regional Research Project W-133: Benefits and Costs in Natural
Resources Planning, Interim Report 2, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics,
Univ. of Maine, Orono, July 1, 1989.
130. H.R. Neill, R.G. Cummings, P.T. Ganderton, G.W. Harrison & T. McGuckin,
"Hypothetical Surveys and Real Economic Commitments", Economics Working Paper B93-1, Department of Economics, College of Business Administration, University of South
Carolina, 1993.
131. This qualification is unusual in most experiments, since it is common practice
in these settings to endow subjects with some cash with which to bid. The effect of such
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Sixteen subjects were given a series of "training experiments" in the
use of a Vickrey auction with induced values, 132 after which they participated in the Vickrey auction for the painting. Forty-one subjects participated in a CVM experiment in which maximum WTP for the art
object was obtained. Average valuations were $37.04 and $9.49 for the
CVM and the Vickrey auction, respectively, with medians of $30 and
$6. The hypothesis of no significant difference between the distribubids obtained from the two experiments was tested and retion of 33
1
jected.
The CVM for the art object did not mimic the rules of provision of the Vickrey auction. Instead, it followed some traditional CVM
questionnaires by not specifying explicitly what the rules of provision
of the public good would be. This weakens the conclusions that can be
drawn from these experiments, since it is conceivable that just altering
the (hypothetical) rules of provision in the CVM to match those used
in the (non-hypothetical) Vickrey auction could alter the elicited WTP
in the CVM. In this case one might well conclude that the problem is
not the hypothetical nature of the payment, but rather the hypothetical nature of the provision rule.
However, in a second series of experiments, Neill et al. 134 rejected this hypothesis. They directly compared the valuations obtained
from a hypothetical Vickrey auction with those obtained in a Vickrey
endowments has not been examined in a controlled manner. To allow for subjects that
might be cash-constrained during the experimental sessions, an interest-free loan for the
weekend was arranged. The experiment was conducted on a Friday afternoon and
subjects knew that the loan had to be repaid by 5:00 pm the following Monday. A loan
contract was signed between the eventual winner and an impecunious research assistant
of the experimenter (who had been privately given a large pot of cash by the experimenter
for this purpose). The loan was repaid as agreed.
132. Actually there were 22 subjects in this stage of the experiment, but 6 are ignored
for reasons explained below.
133. Six of the subjects in these experiments participated in both the CVM and the
Auction, but were not included in the auction data analyses described above. Their
behavior provides a particularly stringent test of the extent to which the CVM constitutes
a real economic commitment. There is an obvious danger in using the same subjects in
the CVM and the auction since there is a chance that this could cause biases in favor of
the CVM as subjects may have felt obliged to actually pay the amount they hypothetically
recorded so as to avoid embarrassment. A possibility exists for the opposite bias, of
course, if subjects are angered by being asked to actually pay for something that they
thought involved an honest and hypothetical survey. This is a "trick" used by many
salesman: asking a subject how much they would be willing to pay for a good, and then
confronting them with a (smaller) actual price. These six subjects volunteered to participate
in the auction after being privately told that it involved them bidding for the art object
out of their pocket. In any event, the six in-sample responses are perfectly consistent
with the out-of-sample responses analyzed above. The subjects reported CVM valuations
of $65, $7, $25, $25, $100 and $5, for an average of $37,83; their corresponding auction
values were $18, $6.27, $2.50, $12, $8 and $5,for an average of only $8.63. Using a
matched-pairs Wilcoxon test one rejects the null hypothesis that these values are the
same at a 4 percent critical level, even though the sample is quite tiny.
134. Supra, note 130.
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auction in which the bid involved a credible financial commitment.
Fifty-one subjects in the hypothetical auction had an average (median)
bid of $301 ($60), and 60 subjects in the real auction had an average
(median) bid of only $12 ($5). The hypothesis of no significant difference between the distribution of bids obtained from the two experiments was again rejected.
A similar conclusion resulted from an experimental study of
the dichotomous choice (DC) format for CVM by Cummings, Harrison and Rutstr6m. 135 They conducted two series of experiments. The
first series attempted to ascertain if the hypothetical DC format was
incentive compatible, as claimed by many CVM researchers.1 36 Using
three different private goods (an electric juicer, a pocket calculator, and
a box of chocolate truffles) they found that hypothetical DC responses
significantly overstated real DC responses for the same good. This series of experiments used simple presentations of the hypothetical DC
questions to establish, as a baseline, if an incentive compatibility problem existed.
The same qualifications applied for the study of Cummings et
al. 137 as for the open-ended experiments of Neill et al. 138 Whether or
not the hypothetical DC question can be presented in a way that reliably elicits truthful responses is not a matter that can be determined a
priori.These experiments demonstrate that some words do not "work"
for some subjects. 39 There is no evidence from these experiments to
suggest that the CVM can reliably elicit real economic commitments
that reflect maximum WTP.
Public Goods
Kealy, Montgomery and Dovidio 140 examine the predictive validity of CVM values for actual cash payment for a private good (a
candy bar) and a public good (a deacidification program for lakes in
the Adirondack region). For one of these goods, the researchers asked
135. R.G. Cummings, et al., "Homegrown Values and Hypothetical Surveys: Is the
Dichotomous Choice Approach Incentive Compatible?", Economics Working Paper B-9212, Department of Economics, College of Business Administration, University of South

Carolina, 1992.
136. See Hoehn and Randall supra note at 237, Michell and Carson supra note at 151,
or Carson, R.T., "Constructed Markets," in J.B. Braden and C.K. Kolstad (eds.), Measuring
the Demand for Environmental Quality, North-Holland (Amsterdam, 1991) at p. 142.

137. Supra note 135.
138. Supra note 130.
139. Furthermore, "focus groups" do not obviously help. None of the subjects in a
focus group interview found any difficulty saying that they interpreted the hypothetical

DC question the way that the researchers interpreted it. Of course, the opinions of
subjects in focus groups cannot be viewed as more than potential clues as to what the
subject actually thinks the question means.

140. Supra note 97.
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a group for their WTP with the understanding that the subjects were
to actually pay their offered amount in two weeks. They asked a second group for a WTP within a hypothetical (CVM) context. Two weeks
later the second group of subjects were asked for an actual payment.
The authors pose the question: when asked for a WTP, does the subject's knowledge that he must actually pay for the good affect the
amount that is reported? They tested two hypotheses. The first was that
preferences were the same among the two groups of subjects. They rejected this hypothesis, a result which suggested to them that "... . in
the hypothetical situation preferences are less well formulated because
subjects have less incentives to seriously contemplate their actual willingness to pay."141 The second hypothesis relates to the extent to which
WTP amounts initially reported by each of the two groups predicted
behavior at the end of two weeks. They found that, for both goods, ini42
tial verbal reports were reasonably correlated with actual payment.
They also examined the effect of foreknowledge that subjects would be
required to actually pay their stated WTP on the degree of correlation
between hypothetical WTP and actual payment behavior. They concluded:
...individuals are more likely to overstate than to understate their [hypothetical) WTP when they are not expecting
to have to make an actual payment [... I [Floreknowledge
of an obligation to pay in accordance with one's verbal statements of willingness to pay has a positive impact on the predictive validity of contingent values.I. 143
Another experiment with a public-like good is reported by Seip
and Strand. 144 A sample of 101 Norwegians were asked in personal interviews whether they would pay 200 Norwegian Kroner for membership
in the Norwegian Association for the Protection of Nature (Norges
Naturvernforbund, NNV), which is the largest and best established private environmental organization in Norway. Sixty-four subjects responded "yes." A short time later, the 64 subjects that answered yes in
the CVM study were sent letters encouraging them to join the NNV at
a membership cost of 200 Kroner. There was no reference in these letters to the earlier CVM study. One month later a second mailing was
sent to subjects that had not joined the NVA as a result of the first let141. Id. at 257.
142. They offer the following caveat, however. "We caution the reader that there is
a strong possibility that our comparisons of first-period report with second-period
behavior could be overly favorable to the predictive validity of the CVM. Subjects may
be reluctant to contradict their previous response even if it overstates their true WTP."
Id. at 258.
143. Id. at 259-260.
144. K. Seip, and J. Strand, "Willingness to Pay for Environmental Goods in Norway:
A Contingent Valuation Study with Real Payment," Environientaland Resource Economics,
2, 91-106, 1992.
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ter. Again, reference was not made to the initial CVM study. At the end
of the second mailing only six of the 64 "yes" respondents in the CVM
actually paid the 200 Kroner to join the NNV.
The researchers interviewed by telephone 25 of the 58 "yes"
respondents in the CVM study who declined to join the organization
after saying they would. Emphasizing the scientific nature of their
study, the researchers asked the subjects why they failed to respond to
invitations to join the NNV. Twenty-four of the 25 subjects indicated
that their WTP expressed in the CVM study was an expression of their
WTP for environmental goods in general, not their willingness to pay
for the NNV in particular. When asked if they would like to change
their original WTP, 17 of the 25 subjects indicated that they would lower
their response. The authors concluded that the results were ". . . dis-

couraging, by indicating that the CVM can imply quite serious biases
of overvaluation, in particular when (like here) the good to be valued
is rather abstract and it is difficult to attach concrete environmental
145
values to it."

Duffield and Patterson 46 used mail surveys to obtain three sets
of values for a fund to be established for the purpose of leasing water
rights to be used for the preservation of in-stream flows in a set of
Montana rivers. They asked one set of subjects (Cash-TNC) to actually
make a tax deductible contribution to an actual fund, the "Montana
Water Leasing Trust Fund," that had been established by the Montana
Nature Conservancy. They asked a second group (Hypo-TNC) a hypothetical question: if contacted in the next month with a request to
make a tax deductible contribution to the Montana Water Leasing Trust
Fund, how much would they be willing to contribute? For the third
group (Hypo-UM), both the fund and payment were hypothetical, although they were also told that a fund could be established. The researchers then asked the maximum amount that subjects would contribute
if contacted in the next month with a request for a contribution. Comparisons of results from Hypo-UM with those from Cash-TNC and HypoTNC are made difficult by differences in the design and follow-up
procedures used. Unlike procedures used in the Cash-TNC and HypoTNC experiments, subjects in Hypo-UM did not receive a brochure describing the trust fund. Extensive follow-up mailings were used in the
Hypo-UM experiment, but not in the Cash-TNC and Hypo-TNC experiments. We therefore only compare results from the two similar experiments: Cash-TNC and Hypo-TNC.
145. Id. at 3.
146. J. Duffield, and D.A. Patterson, "Field Testing Existence Values: An Instream
Flow Trust Fund for Montana Rivers," Unpublished Draft Manuscript, Department of

Economics, University of Montana, Missoula, 1992. We are grateful to John Duffield for
permission to use these data.
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The results of Duffield and Patterson for residents and non-residents are summarized in Table 1.147 Column 2 is the number of delivered questionnaires. 148 Column 3 is the number of questionnaires that
were returned to experimenters. Columns 4-9 are numbers of respondents reporting WTP between zero and $250.
A question of immediate importance for our inquiry as to differences between hypothetical values and those that represent real economic commitments arises from the large differences in response rates.
Is the response rate of 11 percent for the questionnaire requesting real
payment, which is half the response rate for the questionnaire requesting
hypothetical payment, simply a random occurrence, or does it imply a
non-response bias? It is difficult to ignore the potential implications of
the differences in response rates between these experiments involving
real and hypothetical payments, differences seemingly attributed to non149
response bias and/or free-riding behavior by Duffield and Patterson.
If one ignores these differences, the estimate of the sample average WTP
is based on the percentage of returned questionnaires represented by
subjects that bid $10, $25, $50, $100 or $250, yielding an average household value150 of $9.40 for actual cash contributions and $12.70 for hypothetical contributions. The CVM overestimated real economic
commitments by some 35 percent. If instead one takes non-response as
being indicative of a zero value, quite different estimates of population
WTP are obtained: $0.98 if estimates are based on real economic commitments, and $2.97 if estimates are based on CVM results. In this case,
CVM overestimated real economic commitments by 203 percent. Admittedly, this is only one example of an alternative treatment of nonrespondents, but it does illustrate the possible bias of CVM.
In any case, the results of Duffield and Patterson suggest an
overestimate of real economic commitments from values obtained from
the CVM. The extent of this overestimation in their study depends critically on how one interprets and then deals with the non-response question.
CLOSING REMARKS
The courts must soon determine the efficacy of CVM for providing "reliably calculated" statutory use values. The decisions will reflect the degree of speculation that can be tolerated in the court's

147. These data are taken from Id. at Tables 2, 3 and 4.
148, Excluding questionnaires returned due to change of address or incorrect address.
149. Id. at 26.
150. The sum of contributions weighted by the percent of "households" (returned
questionnaires) offering the contribution.
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determination of the legal "necessity" of CVM survey data in CERCLA
cases. Relating both to the court's concern with faulty perceptions and
the "sincerity" of subject responses, we have reviewed the extent to
which the CVM valuation institution provides market-like incentives
for "good choices" and truthful reporting of values.
We maintain that existing empirical results from experimental
economics provide little, if any, evidence that CVM subjects generally
will not free-ride. The valuation institutions used in experimental economics are patently dissimilar from those used in CVM. Moreover, there
is no evidence that unequivocally establishes that subject behavior in
CVM is similar to subject behavior in the institutions used in experimental economics. Nor does there exist unequivocal evidence concerning the pervasiveness of free-riding in the CVM valuation institution
or valuation institutions used in experimental economics. There simply exists no basis for non-speculative, dogmatic statements regarding
free-riding behavior in the CVM one way or another.
We also examined whether people will actually pay amounts
they report in CVM surveys. The little evidence that exists regarding
this question is at best inconclusive. A few studies show that CVM values may be "close" to values that reflect real economic commitments.
However, a number of other studies show that CVM values overstated
real economic commitments, and that these overstatements can be quite
large. The courts must assess the demonstrated potential for such overestimates in their deliberations concerning the legal necessity of results from CVM surveys in CERCLA litigation.

